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This paper provides estimates of individual and aggregate revenue elasticities of income 
and consumption taxes in New Zealand, based on the 2001 tax structure and expenditure 
patterns. Using analytical expressions for revenue elasticities at the individual and 
aggregate levels, together with a simulated income distribution, values for New Zealand 
were obtained. Results using equi-proportional income changes suggest that the 
aggregate income and consumption tax revenue elasticities are both fairly constant as 
mean income increases, at around 1.3 and 0.95 respectively. This latter estimate 
assumes that increases in disposable income are accompanied by approximately 
proportional increases in total expenditure. If there is a tendency for the savings 
proportion to increase as disposable income increases, a somewhat lower total 
consumption tax revenue elasticity, of around 0.9, is obtained for 2001 income levels. 
However, non-equiproportional income changes are more realistic. Allowing for regression 
towards the geometric mean income reduces these elasticities, giving an elasticity for 
income and consumption taxes combined that is only slightly above unity. Examination of 
the tax-share weighted expenditure elasticities for various goods also revealed that, 
despite the adoption of a broad based GST at a uniform rate in New Zealand, the 
persistence of various excises has an important effect on the overall consumption tax 
revenue elasticity, especially for individuals at relatively low income levels. 
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The Built-in Flexibility of Income and 
Consumption Taxes in New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
This paper provides estimates of the built-in flexibility, or revenue elasticity, of income and 
consumption taxes (GST and excise taxes) in New Zealand. It is important for the design 
of tax policy to be able to measure reliably the income elasticity of tax revenues both for a 
tax system and its component taxes. For example, given some revenue target, the need 
for discretionary changes tax rates and thresholds depends on the expected automatic 
revenue growth generated by the system’s built-in flexibility. The extent to which the 
aggregate effective tax rate changes when total income changes depends on a range of 
factors, including consumption patterns and the distribution of individual relative income 
changes associated with the aggregate change. Furthermore, elasticity and progressivity 
are closely related, so that tax changes designed to affect progressivity may have 
unforeseen consequences for elasticity, and vice versa.  
Elasticity values at individual and aggregate levels are reported. These are obtained using 
convenient analytical expressions which have the advantage that they can be evaluated 
readily from relatively little information about the tax structure, income distribution and 
budget shares. Furthermore, the main factors affecting the size of the elasticities can be 
identified, using meaningful and easily interpreted decompositions of the revenue 
elasticities.
1  
Detailed official forecasts of tax revenues in New Zealand are of course frequently made, 
though for various reasons these do not always involve the explicit calculation of revenue 
elasticities. Few independent estimates for New Zealand appear to have been published; 
however, various elasticities are given by van den Noord (2000) for OECD countries. 
This neglect may reflect the perception that, in the presence of lower rates of inflation in 
recent years, a flattening of the income tax structure, and a broad based consumption tax, 
fiscal drag is no longer significant. However, as the analysis below shows, the issue is 
more complex than this simple view would suggest. It is also useful to identify the various 
influences on the size of New Zealand tax revenue elasticities.  
                                                                 
1The approach, involving explicit modelling of the tax structure, contrasts with the use of regression analyses, of time series data on 
tax revenues and income, which are sometimes used to produce aggregate elasticities. Some comparisons of aggregate income tax 
revenue elasticities based both on regressions and on tax-share weighted individual values are given in Giorno et al. (1995), although 
they do not include New Zealand.  
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Section 2 sets out the relevant conceptual expressions for income and consumption tax 
revenue elasticities at the individual level; subsection 2 provides some estimates based 
on the 2001 tax structure. Section 3 defines aggregate revenue elasticity expressions, 
with empirical estimates in subsection 2. These estimates use the standard assumption 
that all incomes increase by the same proportion from year to year. Subsection 3 models 
the more realistic case of non-equiproportional income changes, and allows for a simple 
process of regression towards the geometric mean income.  
In producing aggregate values directly from individual values, the question arises of the 
level of disaggregation to be used, particularly regarding the budget shares. The 
estimates reported here are based on an overall distribution of taxable income and use 
published budget shares for all households combined, rather than considering different 
household types separately; however, the methods could be applied to more 
disagreggated data. Section 4 draws some conclusions.  
2  Individual revenue elasticities 
This section examines tax revenue elasticities for individuals. The variation in individual 
elasticities with income provides a useful independent indication of the local progressivity 
of the tax structure, and of course the individual elasticities provide the basic components 
on which aggregate values are based. The appropriate formulae are given in subsection 
1, and empirical estimates for the 2001 tax structure in New Zealand are reported in 
subsection 2.  
2.1 Elasticity  formulae 
Suppose 
i y T  denotes the income tax paid by individual i with a nominal income of  i y . 
Changes in nominal income with respect to nominal tax allowances affect built-in 
flexibility.
2 The revenue elasticity of the income tax with respect to a change in individual 
income, 







dT y dy mtr






where  i mtr  is the marginal tax rate and  i atr  is the average tax rate faced by i. Here, the 
first subscript of the revenue elasticity, η, refers to the type of tax revenue considered (so 
that in the present case of the individual elasticity, the i subscript is dropped for 
convenience) and the second subscript refers to the income (or tax base) that is 
considered to change. In a progressive tax structure,  ii mtr atr >  for all i,  so that  1
yi Ty η , >.  
This elasticity is also a local measure of progressivity: it is the concept of liability 
progression defined by Musgrave and Thin (1948).  
Consider an individual with gross income of  i y  and facing a multi-step income tax 
function, such that if  1 0 i ya <≤ ,  the tax paid is  0 i yi Tt y = ; if  12 i aya < ≤,  tax paid is 
( ) 01 1 1 i yi Tt a t y a =+ − ; if  23 i ay a < ≤,  tax paid is 
                                                                 
2The exception is where the tax function is homogeneous of degree one in income and allowances, and both are indexed similarly.  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 1 i yi i Tt a t a at y at y a t ta t t =+ − + − =− − − − ,  and so on. Hence if  i y  falls 
into the k th tax bracket, so that  1 kik ay a + < ≤,  and  0 0 a = , income tax can be expressed 





yk i j j j
j








 =−  (2) 
 
where  1 1
k
kj j j k j aa t t t
′ 
 − =  =− / . ∑  Hence the tax paid under a multi-step function is 
equivalent to that paid with a single-step tax structure having a marginal rate,  k t ,  imposed 
on the individual’s income in excess of an effective threshold of  k a
′ .  
Creedy and Gemmell (2003) show that, for this tax function, the individual elasticity, 

















=+ −  − 
 (3) 
This indicates the potentially important role of the elasticity of effective allowances, 
ki ay η ′ , . 
The individual revenue elasticity must exceed unity if  1
ki ay η ′ , < . A positive value of 
ki ay η ′ ,  
can be expected where allowances are income-related, for example when there is tax 
relief for mortage interest payments or pension contributions.
3  
To derive the individual revenue elasticity for consumption taxes, define  i z  as individual 
i’s net income, so that:  
( ) 1 ik ki k za ty t
′ =+−  (4) 
Suppose a proportion,  i γ , of  i z  is consumed, so that total consumption expenditure,  i m , 
is  ii z γ . In general,  i γ  can vary with  i z  and hence with  i y , and can exceed unity over 
some ranges of  i z , as discussed below.  
If the tax-exclusive ad valorem indirect tax rate imposed on the lth good (for  1) n = ,..., l  
is v , l  the equivalent tax-inclusive rate is  ( ) 1 vv v
′ = /+ ll l . Define  i wl  as person i’s budget 
share of the lth good. The consumption tax paid by person i on good l can be written 
as:  
i vi i i i i Tv w m v w z γ
′′
, ==
l ll ll  (5) 
                                                                 
3For example, Creedy and Gemmell (2003) found that  ki ay η ′ ,  takes values around 0.4 for the UK, but varies significantly over time in 
response to changes in the tax deductability of various income-related reliefs such as those for families, pensions and mortgages. 
The value of  ki ay η ′ ,  is of course unlikely to exceed unity.  
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It is required to obtain the consumption tax revenue elasticity for each good, that is, 
vi Ty η ,
l . 
Writing  ii i mw m = ll  as expenditure on the ith good, first note that:  
  
ii i mw m = ll implies:  1
ii i mm wm η η , , = +
ll
ii i mz γ =    implies:  1
ii ii mz z γ η η , , = +  
i vi Tv m
′
=
l ll implies:  1
vi i Tm η , =
l l  
         (6) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to income,  i y , and using the relationships in (6), it can be 
shown that:  
11
vi i i i i i i Ty wm z z y γ η ηη η
   
     ,, , , =+ +
ll  (7) 
where 
ii zy η ,  is the elasticity of disposable income,  i z , with respect to  i y . The second term 
in (7) can be expressed in terms of  i e l , the total expenditure elasticity of demand for the 
lth good by person i, whereby:  
1





l l  (8) 
The last term in (7), 
















ii zy η ,  is the familiar measure of residual progression. Combining (7), (8) and (9) it 


















=+  −  l
l  (10) 
Equation (10) demonstrates that the consumption tax revenue elasticity for good l can be 
decomposed into three terms, reflecting the total expenditure elasticity for good l, the 
way in which the proportion of disposable income consumed by i changes with income, 
and the degree of residual progression determined by individual i’s marginal and average 
income tax rates.  
The consumption tax revenue elasticity for all goods combined, for person i,  
vi Ty η , , can be 
obtained directly from the expression for the consumption tax paid on all goods, 
i v T . 
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Differentiation of (11) then reveals that 






















  ,,  
=   
  −






This result shows that, compared with the revenue elasticity for a single good in (10), the 
tax-share weighted expenditure elasticity appears in (12). To calculate the weighted 
elasticity, it is necessary to distinguish only between goods facing different ad valorum tax 
rates.  
The elasticity of the consumption proportion with respect to income in (10), 
ii z γ η , , also 
varies with incomes if saving rates vary across disposable income levels. While a non-
proportional relationship is generally accepted for cross-sectional income differences and, 
to a lesser extent, for time-series changes over the short-term, changes in the 
consumption proportion over the long-run are probably best regarded as proportional.  
Creedy and Gemmell (2003) allow for the possibility of a non-proportional relationship by 
using the specification:
4  
() ii ma zb =+  (13) 
For this case, it can be shown that 1
ii z γ η , +  in (12) is equal to  () zzb /+. Hence for a 
proportional consumption function (including zero savings, where  1 a = ),  0 b = , 
11

















  ,  
=   






The first two bracketed terms of equation (14) are less than or equal to unity, but the third 
component, shown in curly brackets, may exceed unity for some income levels and tax 
structures. However, 
vi Ty η ,  tends towards unity as income increases.
5  
2.2  Estimates of individual revenue elasticities 
Individual elasticities can identify those taxpayers likely to experience the greatest change 
in tax liabilities as their incomes, or fiscal parameters, change. They therefore also provide 
local measures of tax progressivity. This subsection shows how individual revenue 
elasticities can be expected to vary across income levels in New Zealand.  
                                                                 
4The over-spending at very low income levels can be viewed in terms of the existence of transfer payments and consumption out of 
savings. 
5This is because all expenditure elasticities converge towards unity, although the convergence may not be monotonic, along with the 
first two terms in (14). Creedy and Gemmell (2003a) illustrate this decomposition for the UK.  
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Using information on the New Zealand income tax structure in 2001 to calculate effective 
allowances,  k a
′ , estimates of the income tax revenue elasticity in (3) can readily be 
obtained for a range of individual income levels. Income tax rates of 0.15, 0.21, 0.33, 0.39 
between income thresholds of (NZ$) 0, 9500, 38000, and 60000 were used. These are 
the effective rates and thresholds, allowing for the existence of the Low-Income Rebate. 
For New Zealand, with no initial tax-free allowance and virtually no deductions, tax 
thresholds do not change with individuals’ incomes, so it is reasonable to assume 
0
ki ay η ′ , =  in (3). This simplifies income tax revenue elasticity calculations.  
Consumption tax revenue elasticity calculations require estimates of the ad valorum-
equivalent indirect tax rates. Most goods are taxed at the 12.5 per cent GST rate. 
However some expenditures are exempt from GST (for example, rent and overseas 
travel) while a number of excises produce very different effective tax rates on goods such 
as fuel, alcohol and tobacco. The consumption tax rates used are given in the Appendix.  
It is necessary to have total expenditure elasticities of goods taxed at different rates. For 
this reason it is not possible, even if separate income unit data from budget studies were 
available, to produce precise individual values since estimates must be based on the 
cross-sectional variation in budget shares as total expenditure varies within specified 
groups (defined say by location or demographic characteristics). The estimates reported 
here are based on total expenditure elasticities for all households combined, and were 
obtained from published average expenditures from the 2000-2001 Household 
Expenditure Survey; further details of the method used are discussed in the Appendix.  
Finally, consumption function parameters, a  and b  in (13) are required. In view of the 
considerable difficulty in obtaining reliable information about savings functions, three 
consumption function cases were examined. These are: the no savings case,  1 a = , 
0 b = ; the proportional savings case,  09 5 a = .,   0 b = ; and the non-proportional case, 
08 5 a =. ,  3000 b = . The proportional case assumes that 95 per cent of disposable 
income is spent, while the non-proportional case implies an average propensity to 
consume of 0.95 at NZ$30,000, which is around the arithmetic mean income level.  
Figure 1 shows how the income and consumption tax revenue elasticity (all goods) varies 
across income levels. The income tax elasticity generally declines as income rises, with 
discrete jumps taking place as individuals cross the tax thresholds, reflecting the sharp 
increase in the marginal rate of income tax.  
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Figure 1 – Individual tax revenue elasticities 
For the consumption tax elasticity, two examples of the proportional and non-proportional 
cases are shown. As shown in subsection 1, the shapes of these profiles reflect the three 
combined effects of the progressivity of the income tax, saving habits and differing 
expenditure elasticities across goods (combined with their associated ad valorem rates). 
Income tax progressivity tends to induce a ‘mirror image’ effect in the consumption tax 
profile via changes in disposable incomes. For example, discrete declines are evident in 
the consumption tax elasticity profiles in Figure 1 at the income tax thresholds and, at 
higher income levels, elasticities tend to rise.  
However, at lower income levels consumption tax revenue elasticities also decline, rather 
than showing a mirror image of the decline in the income tax elasticity. This arises 
because of the dominant effect of declines in the tax-share weighted expenditure 
elasticities. For example, examination of these elasticities in Figure 2 reveals substantial 
declines in tax-share weighted expenditure elasticities for vehicles (mainly fuel) and 
tobacco as incomes increase from relatively low levels. Since these expenditures face 
especially high tax rates, changes in these tax-share weighted elasticities dominate 
changes in the weighted average at low income levels. Figure 1 also reveals that the 
elasticities produced by the non-proportional consumption function relationship are 
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Figure 2 – Tax-share weighted total expenditure elasticities 
3  Aggregate revenue elasticities 
This section examines aggregate tax revenue elasticities, which are the most relevant 
from the point of view of tax forecasting and planning, and possible automatic stabilisation 
properties of the tax structure. Subsection 1 presents the basic formulae required and 
subsection 2 reports results for New Zealand in the case of equiproportional income 
changes. The implications of non-equiproportional income changes are examined in 
subsection 3.  
3.1 Elasticity  formulae 
Aggregate revenue elasticities can readily be expressed as a tax-weighted sum of the 
individual elasticities. Letting  Y T  and Y  denote respectively total income tax revenue and 














 ∑  (15) 
Evaluation of the aggregate elasticity therefore requires, in addition to information about 
the income distribution (for computation of the income tax shares 
i yY TT / ), knowledge of 
the extent to which individuals’ incomes change when aggregate income changes, 
reflected in the term 




yY N i η , = = ∑  must hold. A typical 
simplifying assumption is that all incomes increase by the same proportion, so that 
1
i yY η , =  and the aggregate income rax revenue elasticity is a simple tax-share weighted 
average of individual values.  
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where  V T  is aggregate consumption tax revenue. Furthermore, since total revenue is 
YV TTT =+ ,  the elasticity of total revenue with respect to aggregate income can be found 
as a tax-share weighted average of the income and consumption tax revenue elasticities.  
3.2  Estimates of aggregate revenue elasticities 
This subsection uses the analytical expressions in subsection 1, along with the 
assumption of equiproportional income changes, to examine how aggregate revenue 
elasticities vary with aggregate income levels in New Zealand.  
One approach would be to use detailed information, in the form of a large data set 
containing data on individual taxable incomes.
6 However, the method used here (since 
such individual data are available only to a highly restricted group of users in New 
Zealand) is to parameterise the distribution, based on grouped income distribution data, 
and then to produce a simulated distribution of incomes by taking random draws from the 
fitted distribution.  
Figure 5 in the appendix shows the New Zealand grouped income distribution in 2001, 
and discusses the application of a lognormal distribution to summarise the data.
7 It was 
found that a mean and variance of the logarithms of incomes of  98 5 µ =.  and 
2 07 σ = .  
provide a reasonable approximation to parameterise a lognormal income distribution. 
These values imply an arithmetic mean income of $26,903.
8 Each aggregate revenue 
elasticity is obtained using a simulated population of 20,000 individuals, drawn at random 
from the distribution. As the results reported here assume that all incomes increase by the 
same proportion, the relative dispersion of incomes remains constant as incomes change 
over time.  
Figure 3 shows aggregate elasticity profiles for income and all consumption taxes, and for 
total tax revenues, as incomes increase over a range of average income levels.
9 The 
consumption tax profile shown is for the non-proportional consumption case. These 
profiles are approximately linear with the income and consumption tax elasticities at 
slightly below 1.3 and 0.9 respectively. However, the income tax elasticity reveals a 
tendency to rise slightly and then decline at higher average income levels. This decline 
occurs when a large proportion of the income distribution faces the highest marginal 
income tax rate.
10 
                                                                 
6Some studies use an entirely numerical approach, by imposing small income increases on each individual in the data set and 
examining the resulting tax changes, rather than using explicit formulae such as those given above. 
7In Giorno et al. (1995), aggregate income tax revenue elasticities were obtained by fitting lognormal distributions, using information for 
each country about only the ratios of the first and ninth deciles to the median income. Values of individual elasticities were computed at 
16 points on the income distribution. An aggregate elasticity was obtained as the ratio of average (income weighted) marginal rates to 
that of average (income weighted) average tax rates. (The weights were obtained from the first moment distribution of the associated 
lognormal distribution). Unfortunately the ratio of averages is not equivalent to the average of ratios, which is the required measure. 
8In the lognormal case, the arithmetic mean income is derived as 
2 exp{ 2} y µσ = +/ .  
9The 20k values were selected randomly from an initial distribution with a lower mean of logarithms than the 2001 distribution. The 
average income increase, with a fixed variance of logarithms of income, was achieved simply by increasing all incomes by a fixed 
proportion each year. The non-equiproportional case involves a more complex process of income change, as shown below. 
10For the highest average income shown, about one quarter of taxpayers are above the top threshold.  
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Figure 3 – Aggregate tax revenue elasticities 
Figure 4 shows how consumption tax elasticities depend on assumed saving behaviour. 
Revenue elasticity estimates are noticeably higher for the proportional consumption and 
‘no savings’ cases (profiles A and B), but decline more rapidly as income rises, compared 
to the non-proportional case in profile C. For example, at mean income levels of around 
$30,000, elasticities of about 1.0 and slightly below 0.9 are obtained from profiles A and C 
respectively. Figure 4 also suggests that the effect on the revenue elasticity of ignoring 
savings is not substantial provided, when income increases, the proportion of income 
consumed remains approximately constant. 
Figure 4 – Aggregate consumption tax revenue elasticities 
3.3  Non-equiproportional income changes 
This subsection relaxes the assumption of equiproportionate income changes, used in the 
previous subsection and in the vast majority of studies. In line with the present approach 
of using parametric specifications at a fairly high level of aggregation, subsection 1 
presents a function to describe the systematic variation in 
i yY η ,  with  i y . Subsection 2 
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3.3.1 A  specification 
It is convenient to specify a functional form for the variation in 
i yY η ,  with  i y . A suitable 
form, involving just one parameter, is:  
( )( ) 11 l o g
i yY i y η βµ , =− − −  (17) 
where µ  is the mean of logarithms of income (the logarithm of geometric mean income).
11 
This means that if  1 β <  and  i y  is less than geometric mean income, the elasticity, 
i yY η , , 
is greater than unity, and vice versa, so that (17) involves equalising changes. If  1 β >,  
income changes are disequalising. This specification can thus be used to examine the 
sensitivity of aggregate revenue elasticity measures to variations in the standard 
assumption of  1
i yY η , = .
12  
In examining non-equiproportionate changes, according to equation (17), it is also useful, 
when increasing the 20,000 simulated incomes from one year to the next, to impose 
random proportionate income changes, in addition to the systematic equalising or 
disequalising tendency reflected in β . Without such changes, annual income inequality 
changes too rapidly. The specification in (17) is consistent with the following dynamic 
process. Let  it y  denote individual i’s income in period t, and let  t µ  denote the mean of 
logarithms in period t, with  ( ) exp tt m µ =  as the geometric mean. The generating process 

















where  i u  is 
2 0 u N σ


 , . Equation (18) can be rewritten as:  
( ) ( ) 22 11 log log ii i yy u µβ µ −= −+  (19) 
Hence the variance of logarithms of income in period 2, 
2
2 σ  , is given by 
22 2 2
21 u σ βσ σ =+  (20) 
The variance of logarithms is therefore constant when 
22 2





3.3.2 Aggregate  elasticities 
Estimation of equation (19) was carried out for a range of pairs of consecutive years 
during the 1990s, using information from large samples of IR5 and IR3 filers. The results 
                                                                 
11In the case of lognormal income distributions, this is also the median income. 
12For non-equiproportional changes, the aggregate revenue elasticity can now be less than 1; for example it is zero if the only incomes 
which increase are below a tax-free threshold and none crosses the threshold. 
13In general, the variance of logarithms of income increases if the regression coefficient, β , exceeds the correlation between log-
incomes in the two periods. If  1 β <,  the variance of logarithms of incomes eventually becomes stable at 





dynamic income specifications, see Creedy (1985).  
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suggest a relatively stable value of β  of around 08 5 . . This reflects a substantial degree 
of regression towards the (geometric) mean; indeed, with no random component of 
income change this would have the effect of halving income inequality in as little as three 
years. If  08 5 β =.  is combined with 
2 0 194 u σ = .,  the variance of logariths of income 
remains constant over time.
14 These values produce an aggregate income tax revenue 
elasticity, at 2001 mean income, of about 11 1 . . For the proportional and non-proportional 
consumption functions respectively, the aggregate consumption tax revenue elasticities 
are  09 3 .  and 08 3 .,  giving corresponding total tax revenue elasticities of 10 5 .  and 10 3 .  
respectively.  
Regression towards the geometric mean therefore reduces the aggregate revenue 
elasticities. This arises because, for those above the geometric mean income, the value of 
yi i Ty y Y η η ,,  is reduced, and vice versa for those below the geometric mean. The aggregate 
elasticity, from (15), is a tax-share weighted average of these terms, and in view of the 
fact that 
i yY TT /  increases as  y  increases, the lower values of 
yi i Ty y Y η η ,,  at the upper 
income levels dominate.  
To give some idea of the sensitivity of results to the variation in β , consider a value of 
09 β =. ,  which requires 
2 0 133 u σ =.  for a stable degree of income inequality. The 
aggregate income tax elasticity, again at 2001 mean income, is now 11 7 .,  while the 
consumption tax elasticities are 09 6 .  and 08 5 .  for proportional and non-proportional 
consumption functions (giving total revenue elasticities of 11 1 .  and 10 7 . ).  
4 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the revenue responsiveness properties of New Zealand income 
and consumption taxes, based on the 2001 tax structure and expenditure patterns. Using 
analytical expressions for revenue elasticities at the individual and aggregate levels, 
together with a simulated income distribution, values for New Zealand were obtained. 
Treating income growth as equiproportionate, these suggest that the aggregate income 
and consumption tax revenue elasticities are both fairly constant as mean income 
increases, at around 1.3 and 1.0 respectively. This latter estimate assumes that increases 
in disposable income are accompanied by approximately proportional increases in total 
expenditure. Allowing for non-equiproportionate income growth reduces revenue 
elasticities to around 1.1 (income tax) and 0.93 (consumption taxes). If there is a tendency 
for the savings proportion to increase as disposable income increases, a somewhat lower 
total consumption tax revenue elasticity, of around 0.85 - 0.90, is obtained at mean 
income levels which approximate current levels in New Zealand. These elasticities are 
relatively low by international standards. Examination of the tax-share weighted 
expenditure elasticities for various goods also revealed that, despite the adoption of a 
broad based GST at a uniform rate in New Zealand, the persistence of various excises 
has an important effect on the overall consumption tax revenue elasticity, especially for 
individuals at relatively low income levels.  
                                                                 
14This value is in fact similar to that estimated for IR3 filers, though the values obtained for IR5 filers were lower, at about 0.1. Given 
that these samples do not constitute all taxpayers, and in practice inequality is relatively stable, it is appropriate here to model a stable 
variance of logarithms.  
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Appendix: Further details of the elasticity 
computations 
Expenditure elasticities 
Expenditure elasticities were obtained using the published summary table of average 
expenditures over a range of income groups in the 2001 NZ Household Economic Survey 
(HES), obtained from http://www.stats.govt.nz/. This table divides all households in the 
sample into  11 K =  income groups. Within each group the budget shares for each of 
58 n =  commodity groups were obtained (by dividing average expenditure in each 
category by average total expenditure).
15 Denote the arithmetic mean total expenditure of 
the  k th group by  () 1 k mk K = ,...,  and the budget share of the ith commodity group and 
k th total expenditure group by  ( ) 1 ki wi n = ,..., .  
The raw values of these budget shares cannot be used to obtain elasticities because 
sampling variations (particularly for low and high income groups) give rise to negative 
elasticities. Regressions were carried out of the form:  
( ) log
ik





=+ + (21) 
for each commodity group, i. In addition to generally providing a good fit, this 
specification has the advantage that weights based on the estimated parameters add to 
unity.
16 The smoothed budget shares were then used to calculate the total expenditure 
elasticities.  
Differentiating (21), and dropping the k  subscript, gives:  
2
ii i dw b y c
dm m
−
=  (22) 
so that  i w  unequivocally falls as m  rises if  0 i b <  and  0 i c >;  or if  0 i c <,  so long as 
ii mc b >/.  Alternatively, the share rises as income rises (that is, the income elasticity 
exceeds 1) if  0 i b >  and  0 i c <;  or if  0 i c >,  so long as  ii mc b >/.   
The coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The required 








=+  (23) 
with dw dm /  taken from differentiation of (21). 
                                                                 
15Several commodity groups were excluded on the grounds that they more closely represented savings rather than expenditure. The 
ratio of averages is of course not the same as the average budget share (though earlier experiments using data for individual 
households showed that the differences were minor). 
16However, it does not guarantee that the predicted weights always lie in the range 01 w < < , though in practice this was not a 
serious problem; a few negative values at low total expenditure levels for some goods were set to zero and the other shares were 
adjusted accordingly to maintain the adding-up requirement.  
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Appendix Table 1 – Budget share regressions 
 a  b  c  R-squared 
Fruit  -0.00829 0.002749 2.087083 0.26022 
Vegetables 0.054475 -0.00579  -1.37903  0.794889 
Meat 0.225018  -0.02806  -13.3021 0.732829 
Poultry 0.052294  -0.00617 -3.62406 0.302579 
Fish 0.001745 0.000182  0.429412  0.195002 
Farm products, fats, oils  0.126825 -0.0152  -4.4229 0.869153 
Cereals, cereal products  0.135981 -0.01589 -5.7208 0.887933 
Sweet products, beverages  0.139186 -0.01627  -7.28867  0.713447 
Other foodstuffs  0.152218  -0.01774  -8.35408 0.381223 
Meals away from home -0.16374  0.03029 4.718327  0.971466 
Rent 0.622274  -0.08312  -1.83007 0.928584 
Payments to local authorities  -0.0882  0.013836  15.20095 0.950052 
Property maintenance goods  0.081228 -0.0069  -8.63439 0.718421 
Property maintenance  -0.68323 0.100973 43.35151 0.787053 
Housing expenses n.e.c.  -0.03517 0.004634 3.377435 0.741892 
Domestic fuel and power  0.196174 -0.02413  -0.94521  0.976625 
Home appliances  -0.00112 0.003079 2.134009  0.024083 
Household equipment  -0.00563 0.001527  0.727346  0.041477 
Furniture  -0.10488 0.017014 6.453542 0.741345 
Furnishings -0.00076 0.000831 -0.64299 0.451658 
Floor coverings  -0.06074 0.008517  4.952152 0.461902 
Household textiles  -0.01107 0.002411  0.852601 0.124718 
Household supplies  0.078421 -0.00923 -4.4682 0.502538 
Household services  -0.08467 0.015257 16.66589 0.919618 
Men's clothing  -0.0772 0.01134  5.588882  0.523455 
Women's clothing  -0.17633  0.025524  13.84376 0.742386 
Children's clothing  -0.00054 0.000862 0.267848  0.027241 
Other Clothing  0.029442  -0.00308  -3.3534  0.867552 
Clothing supplies & services -0.00295  0.000601 0.434927 0.015415 
Men's footwear  -0.02062 0.003132  1.23944 0.597497 
Women's footwear  -0.06346 0.008629 5.976196  0.878226 
Children's footwear  0.002005  -8.35E-05  -0.35364  0.250285 
Other Footwear  0.010164  -1.05E-03 -1.32814  0.780407 
Footwear supplies & services 0.003267  -3.81E-04 -0.3558  0.337931 
Public transport within NZ -0.06172  0.009624 5.100902 0.503206 
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Appendix Table 2 – Budget share regressions 
  a b c R-squared 
Overseas travel  -0.47099 0.07091  28.55522 0.787953 
Road vehicles  0.291782 -0.02883 -31.0849  0.652508 
Vehicle ownership expenses  0.625611 -0.0743  -42.9299 0.569541 
Private transport costs n.e.c  -0.01354  0.002442  1.589636 0.058705 
Tobacco products  0.166991 -0.0214  -8.79842 0.620878 
Alcohol  -0.12924 0.021882  7.49086 0.629366 
Medical goods  -0.02832 0.004974 3.036628 0.105698 
Toiletries and cosmetics  0.00956 0.000191 -0.92042 0.395319 
Personal goods  0.032463 -0.00257 -3.42718 0.58933 
Pets, racehorses and livestock  0.120291 -0.01498 -7.75913  0.470165 
Stationery and office equip  0.070482 -0.00593 -5.10796 0.308231 
Leisure goods  0.019047 0.000662 -4.02311  0.757771 
Recreational vehicles  0.011469  -0.00076  -2.11383 0.635397 
Goods n.e.c.  -0.0119 0.002321  0.9711 0.140835 
Health services  -0.12371  0.020146  11.10986 0.545345 
Personal services  -0.10878 0.015507 9.209476 0.352852 
Educational and tuition  0.026106 -0.00101  1.068944 0.17518 
Accommodation services  -0.07752 0.011855 4.266511 0.679455 
Fin, insurance and legal  0.097855 -0.00857 -2.83561  0.185043 
Vocational services  -0.00239 0.000818  -0.75566 0.896757 
Leisure services  -0.03519  0.009307  0.15564  0.86498 
Services n.e.c.  0.061889 -0.00639 -7.72831 0.46135 
Outgoings n.e.c.  0.207629  -0.02421  -17.3681  0.078868 
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no. Average  Income 
   -  1  93,213  409.83  30  -31 41,890 30,414  .00 
 1  -2  61,912  1,452.57  31  -32 34,770 31,507  .18 
 2  -3  41,329  2,521.56  32  -33 44,251 32,477  .18 
 3  -4  44,486  3,544.49  33  -34 38,084 33,533  .93 
 4  -5  36,385  4,552.98  34  -35 33,849 34,534  .91 
 5  -6  43,644  5,437.80  35  -36 30,837 35,526  .43 
 6  -7  32,442  6,580.17  36  -37 27,936 36,512  .18 
 7  -8  55,677  7,495.72  37  -38 34,878 37,548  .02 
 8  -9  67,115  8,371.65  38  -39 31,082 38,498  .93 
9  -  9.5  66,408  9,267.31  39  -40 25,273 39,483  .37 
9.5  -  10  42,052  9,707.22  40  -41 27,987 40,563  .92 
10  -  11  143,426  10,669.95  41  -42 30,355 41,480  .31 
11  -  12  89,621  11,513.70  42  -43 17,037 42,551  .03 
12  -  13  74,977  12,571.58  43  -44 19,855 43,478  .16 
13  -  14  80,137  13,429.31  44  -45 20,373 44,647  .87 
14  -  15  163,260  14,396.08  45  -46 15,506 45,453  .50 
15  -  16  53,649  15,422.00  46  -47 15,027 46,560  .53 
16 -  1 7   52,664  16,568.82  47  -48 15,720 47,510  .66 
1 7  -  18  38,984  17,472.11  48  -49 17,132 48,471  .26 
18  -  19  48,558  18,469.33  49  -50 12,519 49,700  .59 
19  -  20  46,773  19,566.15  50  -52 28,862 51,011  .51 
20  -  21  47,134  20,556.02  52  -54 26,642 52,891  .96 
21  -  22  37,598  21,524.06  54  -56 19,947 54,980  .98 
22  -  23  37,181  22,572.31  56  -58 24,379 56,876  .89 
23  -  24  35,388  23,539.56  58  -60 19,203 59,208  .08 
24  -  25  32,699  24,518.45  60  -65 52,194 62,407  .42 
25  -  26  31,564  25,449.60  65  -70 24,748 67,319  .34 
26  -  27  30,796  26,333.18  70  -80 43,913 74,481  .48 
27  -  28  37,842  27,465.45  80  -90 22,783 85,128  .34 
28  -  29  35,810  28,586.43  90  100 19,963 94,708  .39 
29 -  30  35,872  29,622.28  Over 100  47,218  182,074  .25 
 
Income distribution 
The grouped frequency distribution of taxable income in New Zealand for 2000-2001 is 
given in Appendix Table 3. This distribution is for income from all sources, and covers 
employed and self employed individuals. A histogram of this distribution is shown in 
Appendix Figure 1. The second mode at the bottom of the distribution raises a problem 
when using the standard two-parameter lognormal distribution. The pragmatic solution 
was adopted of adjusting the frequencies at the bottom of the distribution, as shown by 
smaller marked blocks for the two lowest income classes. It has in fact been found that 
New Zealand bimodal distributions can be modelled using a mixture distribution 
comprising a weighted average of lognormal and exponential distributions; see Bakker 
and Creedy (1999)   
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The resulting values were then used to obtain the mean and variance of logarithms 
reported above. The implied arithmetic mean value (using the properties of the lognormal 
mentioned above) was found to be close to the arithmetic mean calculated directly from 
the distribution.  
Appendix Figure 1 – Income distribution 
 
Tax rates 
Ad valorem tax-exclusive indirect tax rates are required for the same commodity groups 
as listed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. In most cases the appropriate rate is simply the GST 
rate of 0.125. For rent and overseas travel, the rate is zero. In other cases, particularly 
where excises are involved, the computation of an effective ad valorem rate is 
complicated by the use of unit taxes, in combination with GST, and by the need to 
consolidate a wide variety of goods into a single category. The non-zero rates differing 
from the standard GST rate are as follows: road vehicles 0.07054; vehicle ownership 
expenses 0.58642; tobacco products 2.39845; alcohol 0.46819; recreational vehicles 
0.0625; financial, insurance and legal services 0.0625; and expenditure not elsewhere 
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